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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Cross-Respondent,
Case No. 890121-CA
vs.
Category No. 13
GREGORY J. MARSHALL,
Defendant/Cross-Petitioner,

CROSS-PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the Court of Appeals had any legal basis to rehear the case after
having made its decision on December 26, 1989.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erroneously remanded the case for further
proceedings and in doing so rendered an inconsistent opinion thereby allowing an
issue waived by the Cross-Respondent to be examined, for the first time, in the
Court of Appeals.
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling that the detention of the
Cross-Petitioner was constitutional.
4. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling that the stop of the
Cross-Petitioner was lawful.
5. If consent is found by this Court, the lower court erred in the failing to
reach the issue of whether the consent was exploited from the illegal stop and/or
detention which was not sufficiently distinguishable from the prior illegality to
render the evidence admissible.

OPINION BELOW
This opinion below is the amended opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals
issued on April 18, 1990, in State v. Marshall,

132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 (Ut. Ct.

App. 1990) {See Addendum A for the text of the decision).
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This is a cross petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the Utah Court of

Appeals which reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress
evidence and which remanded the matter to the district court for further
evidentiary hearing. Cross/Respondent petitioned for Writ of Certiorari

on

May 18, 1990. By order dated May 15, 1990, Cross-Petitioner was granted an
extension of time to file its petition for Writ of Certiorari

to May 31, 1990. This

Court has jurisdiction to hear this petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(a) (Supp. 1989) and § 78-2a-4 (1987).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of all constitutional provisions, statutes, Rules and Regulations
controlling in this matter are included in Addendum C attached hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Gregory J. Marshall, was charged with possession of a controlled
substance (marijuana), a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code

Ann.

§ 58-37-8 (1990) (R. 2). Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence
(R. 23-24). The motion was denied (R. 54-55). Defendant filed an interlocutory
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 91, 187).
On December 26, 1989, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's

2

denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress on the basis that "Mr. Marshall did
not consent to the search of the locked suitcases found in the trunk of his vehicle"
(footnote omitted) (State

v. Marshall,

124 Utah Adv. Rptr. 59 at 65, Addendum

B). (Utah Ct. App. 1989) The State petitioned for rehearing which was granted.
On April 18, 1990, the Court of Appeals issued its amended opinion. The court's
amended opinion reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress but
also remanded the case for rehearing:
". . . on the limited issues of whether Mr. Marshall
voluntarily consented to the search of the trunk or the
suitcases, whether Mr. Marshall abandoned any privacy
interest in the suitcases and thus lacks standing to
challenge their search, and finally, if the trial court finds
there was an illegal search of the truck or suitcases,
whether there is a sufficient nexus between that illegal
search and Mr. Marshall's abandonment, if any, of his
expectation of privacy in the suitcases"
(Addendum A, State v. Marshall,

132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 at 50-51)

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
According to the testimony of the arresting officer, on April 25, 1988, he
stopped the vehicle of the Cross-Petitioner, travelling east bound on 1-70 after it
(the vehicle) had passed a motor home (R.56) [This is the page following page 56,
to which the clerk omitted giving a number]. The officer has repeatedly testified
that the reason he stopped the vehicle was because the Cross-Petitioner had left
his turn signal on for approximately two miles, which the officer considered to be
a violation of the Utah State Law (R.56). It was his intent, at the time he stopped
the vehicle, to advise the operator of the turn signal problem (D.l,p.l5, 1.10)

3

(T.l.p.Sjl.lS^l). 1
Upon making contact with the driver, the officer testified that he informed
the Cross-Petitioner that his turn signal had been left on and proceeded to conduct
a further investigation. In the course of this detention and prior to obtaining any
"alleged consent" to search the vehicle, the officer became suspicious that there
may be drug activity based upon the application of a "drug courier profile". In
support of the officer's suspicion, he stated that:
a. Before the stop, he noticed the following:
1. That the vehicle had out-of-state license plates from California (R.57)
(T.l.p.l3;1.8-12 and T.l.p.l0;1.6-10).
2. He acknowledged that, in his experience, a car traveling east may indicate
that the car is carrying drugs and a car traveling west might be more likely carrying
money (R.57) (T.l.p.ll;l.l-4).
3. He also noticed, prior to stopping the vehicle, that there was one male
individual in the vehicle who could be seen and that, in his experience, it was more
likely that a male would be carrying drugs than a female (R.57) (T.l.p.ll;1.12-25
andT.l.p.l2;l.l-13).
b.

Upon making contact with Cross-Petitioner, the officer noticed and

commented on the following:
1. That the driver had an "eastern" accent (R.57) (T.l.p. 12:1.24-25 and

\ The record in this matter includes the testimony of Trooper Dennis Avery
of the Utah Highway Patrol at the Suppression Hearing, (T.l); the Preliminary
Hearing (T.2); and his deposition in a related matter (D.l), that is, State of Utah
v. One Thousand One Hundred Ninety Seven Dollars in United
States
Currency, Case No. 10246, a forfeiture action presently pending before the 6th
Judicial District Court in and for Sevier County, State of Utah.
A

T.i.p.l3;l.l) and that he produced a New York driver's license.
2. He indicated that the fact the individual was obviously from New York
and was driving an automobile rented in California aroused his suspicions (R.5758) (T.l.p.l3;1.8-12).
3. The other information he noticed during the course of his investigation
that raised his suspicion was that there was one small, red bag, a can of "Fix-aFlat", a CB radio, and a steering wheel locking device in the front seat area of the
vehicle (R.58) (T.l.p.l3;1.21-25 and T.l.p.l4;l.l-2). The fact that he could see no
other luggage in the vehicle and just the one small bag was suspicious to the
officer even though at that point he did not know if there was luggage in the trunk
(R.58) (T.l.p.l4;1.3-10).
4. The officer also stated that Cross-Petitioner avoided eye contact with him
and seemed to be somewhat nervous (R.58) (T.l.p.30;l. 16-25 and D.l.p.53;l.ll).
5. The officer further testified that he asked Cross-Petitioner for the vehicle
rental agreement which he examined, indicating that the car was to be turned into
a different location than the Cross-Petitioner told him where he was possibly going
to return the vehicle. Nevertheless, the officer acknowledged that at the bottom
of the rental agreement it showed that the car didn't necessarily have to be
returned to the destination that was stated (R.58) (T.l.p.l4;l. 17-25 and
T.l.p.l5;l.l-17).
Based on the foregoing observations and prior to asking the Cross-Petitioner
if he could "look in the vehicle" (R.59) (T.l.p.22;l. 11-15), the officer testified that
he determined he would get a search warrant to search for controlled substances
even though there was no apparent evidence of controlled substances in the
5

interior of the car or any other evidence of illegal activity (R.59) (T.l.p.l5;l.19-25
andT.l.p.20;1.14-19).
After issuing the warning citation and while Cross-Petitioner was seated in
the officer's patrol car, the officer proceeded to question Cross-Petitioner (R.59)
(T.l.p.20;1.20-25). He did not advise Cross-Petitioner that he was free to leave
after he gave him back his driver's license, registration and warning citation (R.59)
(T.p.21;1.2-13). The officer further testified that although Cross-Petitioner was
free to leave, if Cross-Petitioner had tried to leave, he would have found it to be
more suspicious activity and would have stopped him (R.59) (T.l.p.21;L14-18 and
T.l.p.22;1.22-25 to p.23;l.l-2).
The officer thereafter questioned Cross-Petitioner as to whether he was
carrying certain items such as firearms, drugs or alcohol (R.59) (T.l.p.22;1.6-9).
After receiving the Cross-Petitioner's response he asked if he could, "Look in the
vehicle."

(R.59) (T.l.p.22;l.11-15).

Mr. Marshall acquiesced to the officer's

request to "look in the vehicle" whereupon the officer examined the passenger
compartment of the vehicle, including the red bag which Cross-Petitioner had in
the front seat.
After searching the interior of the vehicle and its contents and finding no
indication of contraband, the officer asked the Cross-Petitioner "if he had a key"
(to the trunk) and "if he would open it" (R.60) (T.l.p.27;1.12-14).
Inside the trunk were four bags which the officer proceeded to search. He
claims he found a green/leafy substance in one of the bags. The bags were
padlocked at the time and the bag in which the green/leafy substance was found
had to be broken open to be searched.
6

POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD NO LEGAL BASIS TO REHEAR
THE CASE AND MODIFY ITS DECISION FROM DECEMBER 26,
1989.
The Court of Appeals initially made its decision in this matter on December
26, 1989. Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals,

the

rule governing rehearing, "a petition for rehearing must state with particularity
the points of law or fact which the petitioner claims the Court has overlooked or
misapprehended." Case law establishes that a rehearing is only warranted on those
grounds. See e.g. Cummings
(1913); Brown v. Pickard,

v. Nielsen,

42 Utah 157, 172-173, 129 P. 619, 624

4 Utah 292, 11 P. 512 (1886). Since the Respondent

sought rehearing, it was the Respondent's burden to establish that the Court erred
under either of the above-stated grounds.
Neither the Cross-Respondent's Petition nor the Court of Appeals' Amended
Decision establish that any law or facts were overlooked or misapprehended. The
Court of Appeals, nevertheless, in its amended opinion, modified its prior ruling
and remanded this matter for further proceedings before the trial court, on the
basis that the finding below was insufficient.

No where in the opinion did the

Court of Appeals rule that either of the parties had overlooked or misapprehended
facts or law. The facts developed below were sufficient for the Court of Appeals
to make its initial determination to overturn the trial court and are sufficient for
this Court to make a determination on the present record. The opinion does not
evidence that facts were overlooked or misapprehended - it merely confirms that
the Cross-Respondent simply did not meet its evidentiary burden. The lower Court
did not rule that law was overlooked. Instead, it affirmed its prior legal rulings
7

with the exception of reserving on the issue of consent. The opinion resulting from
the rehearing contradicts the prior opinion by stating that the findings were now
found to be insufficient, when they were not in the first instance and are not
presently. The Cross-Respondent has never argued to the Court of Appeals that
the findings were not sufficient for appellate review. Rehearing was therefore
inappropriate.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY REMANDED THE
CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. IN DOING SO IT
RENDERED AN OPINION WHICH WAS INCONSISTENT AND
ALLOWED AN ISSUE, WAIVED BY THE CROSS-RESPONDENT
IN THE TRIAL COURT, TO BE EXAMINED FOR THE FIRST
TIME.
The Court of Appeals' second opinion did not modify any of the legal rulings
made on the issues raised on appeal in this case. Despite the Appellate Court's
ability to render its first decision based on the findings on the record, that Court
subsequently determined that it did not have a sufficient record to decide the issue
of consent. Additionally the lower court decided that the issue of abandonment,
which was never raised until the appeal, needed to be explored.
"Upon a re-examination of the record we agree with the
State that the parties and the trial judge did not focus on
the critical issue of the search of the suitcases at the
motion to suppress hearing. The result is that the trial
judge did not make adequate findings of fact on the
issues of voluntary consent to search the trunk or the
suitcases and Mr. Marshall's alleged abandonment of any
privacy interest in the suitcases which the parties now
agree are pivotal on appeal. We therefore remand for a
rehearing on these issues.
State

v. Marshall,

132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 at 49. (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

Cross-Petitioner asserts that any remand for the purposes of further
8

proceedings on the record is both unnecessary and improper, given the status of
the record in this case.
A.

THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS WERE SUFFICIENT
FOR THE APPELLATE COURT TO DETERMINE THE
ISSUE.

The trial judge made a findings of fact that "the defendant consented to the
search. There was no evidence of duress or coercion." (R. 89) There is nothing
in the lengthy record of this case that would preclude the Court of Appeals from
making a determination that that finding was erroneous as they did in the first
opinion. All of the facts necessary to determine the legal issues were developed
within the record. It is the State's burden to show a warrantless search is lawful.
State v. Christensen,

676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1984). What that record clearly

demonstrates though, is that the State failed to meet its burden of proving there
was voluntary consent to search the suitcases, even by a preponderance of the
evidence.

The lower court's initial ruling that the State had failed to prove

consent was appropriate and capable of being rendered from the record. The trial
court judge's determination to the contrary was erroneous, and remand for further
findings is unnecessary.
B.

REMANDING THE CASE FOR FURTHER HEARING IS
INAPPROPRIATE.

It is unclear from the lower court's ruling whether the court remanded for
further evidentiary hearing. It is clear, however, from the ruling of the court, that
the Court of Appeals expected a determination of an issue never presented by the
State in the lower court.
. . . therefore we reverse and remand this interlocutory
appeal for rehearing on Mr. Marshall's motion to
9

suppress on a limited issues of whether Mr. Marshall
voluntarily consented to the search of the trunk or the
suitcases, whether Mr. Marshall abandoned any privacy
interest in the suitcases and thus lacks standing to
challenge their search and finally, if the trial court finds
there was an illegal search of the trunk or suitcases,
whether there is sufficient nexus between that illegal
search and Mr. Marshall's abandonment, if any, of his
expectation of privacy in the suitcases."
State

v. Marshall,

132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 at 50-51 (Utah. Ct. App. 1990)

The Court, in this opinion, was not specific as to whether or not further
evidence needed to be taken, which the Cross-Petitioner asserts leaves the matter
open inappropriately.
The trial court did not make adequate findings on voluntary consent to
search the suitcases, or that there was an inadequate finding as to the
abandonment of any privacy issue to justify a remand. As argued to the Appellate
Court in its Answer to Petition for Rehearing and Reply Brief to the Respondent's
brief, the Respondent did not raise the issue of abandonment in the lower court
and it is therefore inappropriate to have directed the lower court to address it
now. The only basis ever argued to justify the search was consent. Remanding for
a determination of abandonment is inappropriate.
The Court justifies its direction by stating "the parties now agree that issue
is pivotal on appeal". That finding by the Court is absolutely erroneous. CrossPetitioner has persisted in the argument that abandonment, as well as standing,
having not been raised as an issue in the trial court, can not, and should not be
raised on appeal. This issue was never argued in the trial court, either at the
Suppression Hearing or in briefs submitted to the trial court. Consent was all that
was relied upon. Cross-Petitioner has consistently relied on the rule that a new
10

issue cannot be raised on appeal. It is not now, nor has it ever been a pivotal issue
to this case. Cross-Petitioner asserts that a remand a determination of that issue
in the lower court, when it was neither raised nor argued in the trial court, is
inappropriate. The lower court' decision then, if allowed to stand, authorizes
consideration anew of an issue not raised below and apparently abandoned by the
State before the trial court.
Given the record in this matter, to suggest that any further hearings ought
to be conducted in this case, is both patently unfair and improper, particularly
when the State's counsel abandoned or conceded the issue below. What the Court
of Appeals' amended decision effectively proposes is that the State, having failed
to build its record in the trial court and having failed to raise the arguments that
they claim the facts may have supported, should be given a chance to correct the
record for its own purposes and to the prejudice of the Cross-Petitioner.
C.

THE LIMITED ISSUES REMANDED
DETERMINATION ARE INAPPROPRIATE.

FOR

The lower court remanded the case for hearing on the following limited
issues:
First, whether or not Mr. Marshall voluntarily consented to the search of the
trunk or the suitcases was erroneous. The trial court made a determination that
there was Consent. That determination was not supported by the record, as the
initial opinion of the Court of Appeals verifies.

Reopening the record and

requesting additional findings would not cure that problem.
Cross-Petitioner does not concede that the Court of Appeals' initial
determination that the search of the trunk was consensual. The record does not
11

establish consent.
Legally, the officer was without authority to request the search because it
was done so after the warning ticket was issued and there was no other suspicious
evidence warranting a detention. Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-167 (1953 as amended)
is a forthwith release statute. It provides that the officer is to give written notice
to appear on motor vehicle code violations. If the person signs a written promise
to appear, and the officer has no reason to believe the individual will not appear
or pay the ticket - he is to "forthwith release the person arrested from custody".
Failure to do so is a crime.

A person stopped and detained for a problem

warranting only a warning ticket is certainly entitled to the benefit of that
provision. The officer's further questioning of the Cross-Petitioner in this case,
was outside his legal authority thereby violating any purported consent.
Additionally, this officer never advised the Cross-Petitioner that he did not
have to consent. Cross-Petitioner asserts that Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution should be interpreted to require informed consent.
Further, Mr. Marshall was directed to open the trunk, not asked. There was,
therefore, no factual consent. The State also never established, on the record, that
the voluntariness standards of U. S. v. Abbott,

546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977) were

met.
The Court of Appeals initially correctly determined that the State had failed
to meet its burden of proving any consent in connection with the suitcases. Any
consent to the trunk did not encompass the suitcases and was beyond its scope.
U.S. v. Gay, 11A F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985); People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193,
201 (Colo. 1984)
12

Second, the Court of Appeals remands for the purposes of determining
whether Mr. Marshall abandoned any privacy interest in the suitcases and thereby
lacked standing to challenge their search.

A remand for that purpose is

inconsistent with the Court's ruling in the first part of its opinion where the Court
stated that the State should be precluded from raising the issue of standing on
appeal because of their failure to raise it in the trial court. It is without logic then
to remand this matter so that there can be a trial court proceeding with direction
that those issues be developed and addressed.

Having failed to raise either

abandonment or standing in the trial court, it is not appropriate to remand to the
trial court only for the purposes of allowing the State to cure its error.
Third, the remand for a determination as to whether or not there was an
illegal search of the trunk or suitcases, and if so, whether there is a sufficient
nexus between the illegal search and Mr. Marshall's abandonment, once again, is
merely giving the State the opportunity to address an issue which they waived by
failing to argue it to the trial court.
The Court of Appeal's decision to remand for further examination of the
above-stated issues is not only inconsistent with its ruling on the State's burden to
assert standing and prove consent, but effectively establishes a different standard
for the State than a defendant in a criminal matter. If the opinion were allowed
to stand, this Court would be condoning this double standard. Defendant's cannot
raise new issues on appeal, but the State, if they fail to raise issues, is entitled to
reopen the trial court record and have a second opportunity.
Further, the opinion ignores the burdens placed on the State when a
warrantless search is challenged.

The State's failure to take advantage of an
13

opportunity to argue the issues that they claim the facts may have developed
should preclude them from being allowed in a remand situation to go back and
attempt to cure any perceived error. This Court can and should determine from
the record that the prior Court of Appeals' initial opinion regarding consent to
search the suitcases was correct and that the State failed to meet its burden to
prove consent otherwise, even by a preponderance of evidence, under applicable
case law.
POINT HI
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE
DETENTION
OF T H E
CROSS-PETITIONER
WAS
CONSTITUTIONAL, WAS ERRONEOUS.
In both opinions, the Court of Appeals ruled "we find that Trooper Avery's
questioning of Mr. Marshall as to conduct unrelated to the traffic stop was
justified because he had reason to believe Mr. Marshall was engaged in a more
serious crime." State

v. Marshall,

132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 at 47. This matter

involved a stop that was based solely on the failure of a blinker light to turn off
within a period of time satisfactory to the officer.

The officer, thereupon

conducted a fishing expedition before and after a warning ticket was given to the
Defendant which was not related to the traffic investigation nor supported by any
reasonable suspicion.
Under the Fourth Amendment and applicable Constitution law, even if there
is an arguably proper stop of a vehicle for a traffic offense there must be probable
cause to detain the individual for investigation beyond the traffic violation. Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); U.S. v. Gonzales,
U.S. v. Guzman,

763 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1985);

864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988). Recently, in U.S. v.
14

Walker,

No. 90-CR-013, (D. Utah 1990) (granting motion to suppress) the United States
District Court for the District of Utah ruled that asking questions about alcohol,
drugs and firearms, at the conclusion of a traffic investigation, constituted an
illegal detention if there was not evidence of the same.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-162 (1953 as
amended), upon signing of an promise to appear, further detention by an officer
is illegal. That provision should equally apply in this case, where only a warning
citation was issued.
Appellant submits that the criteria relied upon by the officer to validate his
detention does not support a finding of probable cause to continue to detain and
question the Cross-Appellant about unrelated matters, nor detain for the purposes
of requesting a search.
POINT IV
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE STOP
OF THE CROSS-PETITIONER WAS LEGAL WAS ERRONEOUS.
In both its original and amended opinion, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the stop of Defendant's vehicle was proper in that the stop was not pretextual and
was justified because the officer believed the vehicle's safety equipment was not
functioning properly. State v. Marshall,

132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 at 46-47.

Cross-Appellant submits there was no crime committed in the officer's
presence to meet the criteria of Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953 as amended) a stop incident to a traffic violation. There exists no statute in the State of Utah
which states it is a crime or an offense of any kind to fail to turn off a turn signal.
The facts of this case do not support any finding that the turn signal failure in this
15

case constituted another traffic violation.
Cross-Appellant further submits that Article I Section 1, Article I Section
7, Article I Section 27, and Article I Section 24 of the Utah Constitution, dictate
that under the circumstances of this case less intrusive means than a stop and
detention were mandated given the fact no statute was or could have been relied
upon for the stop.
In both opinions, the Court of Appeals concluded "unlike the officer in
State

v. Sierra,

754 P.2d 792 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988) Trooper Avery was not

suspicious of Mr. Marshall for other reasons. . ." The court then concluded that
the stop of the Cross-Petitioner was not pretextual. The record is replete with
facts that the arresting officer relied on which facts are the same type of improper
criteria present in Sierra, supra. This improper criteria and the officer's "hunch"
validated his continual investigation of the Cross-Petitioner. The finding that the
stop was not pretextual and was warranted in both of the Court of Appeals'
opinion, is erroneous.
POINT V
IF LEGAL CONSENT IS FOUND THE CONSENT WAS
EXPLOITED FROM THE ILLEGAL STOP AND/OR DETENTION
AND WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE
PRIOR ILLEGALITY TO RENDER THE
EVIDENCE
ADMISSIBLE.
Under U.S. v. Recalde,

761 F.2d 1448 at 1457-1458 (10th Cir. 1985), if a

consent search results from an illegal stop or detention, the consent must be
examined under the following rule:
In the context of voluntary consent, we hold that
'exploitation of the primary illegality' means that the
police used the fruits of the primary illegality to coerce
16

the defendant into granting his consent.
We also hold that in the context of voluntary consent, the
'sufficiently distinguishable' standard in Wong Sun
refers to means of obtaining evidence substantially
independent of the prior illegality. United States v.
Carson, 793 F.2d 1141 at 1149. (10th Cir. 1986)
Defendant submits that the officer's illegal and pretextual stop and illegal
detention for further questioning beyond the scope of the traffic violation - in
order to confirm the officer's "hunch" or "gut instinct" - made any consent tainted
and ineffective.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals has rendered an amended opinion in this matter which
is inherently inconsistent. A remand for a determination of issues abandoned by
the State in the trial court and not raised until appeal is a departure outside the
accepted and usual course of procedures. The amended opinion is in conflict with
the first opinion rendered and therefore this Court should render a decision
resolving the same by affirming the first opinion on the issues of consent and
standing or ruling the search was illegal on the basis stated in this Cross-Petition.

$f
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There was no agreement by the Joan Cingolani plaintiffs to redeposit their shares with the
district court in the event the Anna Cingolani
plaintiffs successfully challenged the judgment
and order of distribution on appeal, and there
was no agreement by the Anna Cingolani
plaintiffs to do the same if the Joan Cingolani
plaintiffs successfully challenged the judgment
and order of distribution in their appeal. With
regard to the attorney fee claim, Anna and
GWWB did not seek a stay of the September
22, 1988, order distributing one-third of the
Joan Cingolani plaintiffs' recovery to HLP.
Instead, Anna and GWWB acquiesced in the
clerk's disbursement of the full contingent fee
to HLP in accordance with Judge Harding's
order and did not obtain any agreement from
HLP to redeposit those funds with the district
court if Anna prevailed in this court on the
attorney fee distribution claim.
As a result of these actions by the parties
and Anna's counsel, the issues raised in both
appeals are moot. There is no longer any settlement money on deposit with the clerk of the
district court, and there is no basis on which
either the trial court or a party successful on
appeal could compel the other party's return
of the disbursed funds to the district court for
redistribution. In short, even if we were to
agree with one of the appellants on the settlement distribution claim or with Anna and
GWWB on the attorney fee distribution claim,
we could not afford any relief to the successful appellant. See Black, 656 P.2d at 410.
Appellants have not raised, and we do not
perceive, any issues of public interest, see
Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah
1981), or any other extraordinary circumstances constituting an exception to the mootness
doctrine, see Reynolds, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. at
33, that would justify our consideration of the
merits of these moot appeals. We therefore
dismiss both appeals, with the parties to bear
their own costs.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
John Farr Larson, Judge
1. John Fair Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, sitting
by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989).
2. Although technically an appellee in both cases,
Utah Power & Light Company is not an active
participant in either appeal because the two groups
of appellants are fighting with each other over the
distribution of the settlement to which all appellants
agreed.
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Petition for Interlocutory Appeal
AMENDED OPINION*
BILLINGS, Judge:
The appellant, Gregory J. Marshall ("Mr.
Marshair), was charged with possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to distribute for value, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8
(1989). Mr. Marshall filed a pretrial motion to
suppress the 140 pounds of marijuana seized
from the rental car he was driving when he
was arrested. The trial court denied Mr.
Marshall's motion and he filed this interlocutory appeal. We reverse and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
We recite the facts surrounding the seizure
of the contraband in detail as the legal issues
presented are fact sensitive. State v. Sierra,
754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery
("Trooper Avery") was driving on Interstate
70 near Salina, Utah. He noticed Mr. Marshall's vehicle in the left-hand lane passing a
motor home. Trooper Avery observed that
Mr. Marshall's turn signal remained blinking
for approximately two miles after he passed
the motor home. Not knowing whether Mr.
Marshall's signal was malfunctioning or
whether Mr. Marshall had negligently left the
signal on, Trooper Avery pulled the vehicle
over to inform Mr. Marshall of the problem
and to give him a warning ticket. Trooper
Avery had issued similar warning citations for
turn signal violations approximately five to ten
times in the previous six-month period.
CE REPORTS
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Prior to stopping Mr. Marshall, Trooper
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Avery noticed the vehicle had California
"[W]e
will not disturb the trial court's
license plates. He approached Mr. Marshall's
vehicle and informed Mr. Marshall of the turn factual evaluation underlying its decision to
signal problem. Mr. Marshall responded that grant or deny a motion to suppress unless it is
he had been having "a hard time keeping the clearly erroneous." State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d
972, 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). See also State
thing turned off."
Trooper Avery asked Mr. Marshall for his v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); State
driver's license and vehicle registration. Mr. v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct.
Marshall produced a New York driver's App. 1989). Further, "[t]he trial court's
license and a California rental agreement for finding is clearly erroneous only if it is against
the vehicle. Mr. Marshall said he was going the clear weight of the evidence or if [the
skiing in Denver and planned to return the car appellate court] reach [es] a definite and firm
to San Diego, California. However, the rental conviction that a mistake has been made." State
agreement indicated that the car would be v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
returned in New York in five days.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c)
Trooper Avery acknowledged he became
suspicious that Mr. Marshall might be trans- requires the trial court to state its findings on
porting drugs. Trooper Avery asked Mr. the record "[w]here factual issues are involved
Marshall to return with him to his patrol car in determining a motion." Those findings must
where he issued a warning citation for "Lights, be sufficiently detailed in order to allow us the
to adequately review the decision
head, tail, other." Trooper Avery then retu- opportunity
1
rned Mr. Marshall's driver's license and the below.
rental agreement.
PRETEXT STOP
Trooper Avery next asked Mr. Marshall if
Initially, Mr. Marshall contends Trooper
he was carrying alcohol, drugs or firearms. Avery used the fact that his turn signal was
Mr. Marshall stated he was not. Trooper malfunctioning as a pretext to stop his vehicle
Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if he could to search for evidence of drug trafficking.
"look inside the vehicle." Mr. Marshall respThe protective shield of the fourth amendonded, "Go ahead." Trooper Avery and Mr. ment applies when an officer stops an autoMarshall walked back to Mr. Marshall's mobile on the highway and detains its occupvehicle. The passenger door was locked and ants. Stare v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah
Mr. Marshall reached in on the driver's side Ct. App. 1988). A police officer may constitto open the door. Trooper Avery noticed a utionally stop a citizen on two alternative
small red bag on the floor of the vehicle and grounds. First, the stop "could be based on
asked if he could open it. Mr. Marshall specific, articulable facts which, together with
agreed. No contraband was found inside the rational inferences drawn from those facts,
bag or the passenger compartment of the would lead a reasonable person to conclude
vehicle.
[defendant] had committed or was about to
Trooper Avery then asked if Mr. Marshall commit a crime." Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio,
had a key to the trunk and if Mr. Marshall 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v. Christensen,
would open the trunk. Mr„ Marshall attempted 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984); State v. Truto open the trunk, but was shaking so badly jillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)).
that Trooper Avery had to assist him by Second, the police officer can "stop an autoholding the key latch cover up while Mr. mobile for a traffic violation committed in the
Marshall inserted the key. Trooper Avery saw officer's presence." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977.
four padlocked suitcases when Mr. Marshall However, an officer may not use a traffic
opened the trunk. Trooper Avery asked Mr. violation stop as a pretext to search for evidMarshall what the suitcases contained and Mr. ence of a more serious crime. Id.
Marshall responded "clothes." Trooper Avery
To determine if Trooper Avery stopped Mr.
then asked if he could look in the suitcases. Marshall's vehicle to investigate his hunch
Mr. Marshall immediately reversed his state- that Mr. Marshall's vehicle was involved in
ment and responded that the suitcases were drug trafficking, we determine whether a
not his and must have already been in the hypothetical reasonable officer, in view of the
trunk when he rented the vehicle. Trooper totality of the circumstances confronting him
Avery testified there was some play in the or her, would have stopped Mr. Marshall to
zipper of one bag and he unzipped it far issue a warning for failing to terminate a turn
enough to see a green leafy substance. Trooper signal. Id. at 978.
Avery then arrested Mr. Marshall for possesMr. Marshall claims Trooper Avery's stop
sion of a controlled substance.
of his vehicle is similar to the stop we found
Mr. Marshall did not testify or present any unconstitutional in Sierra. We disagree. In
evidence to contradict Trooper Avery's testi- Sierra, the basis articulated for the stop was
mony during the hearing below.
that the driver remained in the left lane too
long after passing a car. In this case, Trooper
REPORTS
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Avery perceived an equipment problem with
Mr. Marshall's car. Either his turn signal was
malfunctioning or he had negligently failed to
turn it off.2 Courts consistently have held that
a police officer can stop a vehicle when he or
she believes the vehicle's safety equipment is
not functioning properly.3
Furthermore, unlike the officer in Sierra,
Trooper Avery was not suspicious of Mr.
Marshall for other reasons before the stop,
had not followed him in order to find some
reason to pull him over, and, before the
alleged violation occurred, had not radioed for
help thereby indicating he intended to stop the
vehicle.
In conclusion, we find Trooper Avery's
stop of Mr. Marshall's vehicle was not a
pretext, but was a valid exercise of police
authority to make certain Mr. Marshall's
vehicle was functioning properly.
UNREASONABLE DETENTION
Next, Mr. Marshall complains that the
extent of his detention and the scope of
Trooper Avery's investigation exceeded constitutional limits.4
"[I]n determining whether the seizure and
search were 'unreasonable' our inquiry is a
dual one-whether the officer's action was
justified at its inception, and whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place/ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1968).
We have previously found that Trooper
Avery's traffic stop of Mr. Marshall was
justified. The remaining question is whether
Trooper Avery's subsequent detention and
questioning of Mr. Marshall was reasonably
related to the initial traffic stop or was justified because Trooper Avery had a reasonable
suspicion to believe Mr. Marshall was engaged
in a more serious crime. United States v.
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir.
1988).
The United States Supreme Court has not
chosen to define a bright-line rule as to the
acceptable length of a detention because
"common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria." United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985).
The Court has chosen to focus, not on the
length of the detention alone, but on "whether
the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel
their suspicions quickly, during which time it
was necessary to detain the defendant." Id. at
686.
Trooper Avery wrote out the warning citation within ten minutes of stopping Mr.
Marshall and then returned Mr. Marshall's
driver's license and the vehicle rental agreement. Trooper Avery claims that as a result of
his examination of Mr. Marshall's driver's
license and the vehicle rental agreement and
UTAH ADVA

his brief conversation with Mr. Marshall, he
became suspicious that Mr. Marshall was
involved in drug trafficking. Specifically,
Trooper Avery points to the fact that Mr.
Marshall produced a New York driver's
license and a California rental agreement for
the vehicle. When questioned about the rental
agreement, Mr. Marshall said he was going
skiing in Colorado and planned to return the
car to San Diego, California. However, the
rental agreement indicated the car was to be
returned to New York in five days, the approximate time it takes to drive directly from
California to New York. In addition, Mr.
Marshall was driving along a well-known
drug trafficking route.
As a result of his suspicion, Trooper Avery
then asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying
weapons, alcohol, or drugs in the vehicle. Mr.
Marshall responded he was not. Then Trooper
Avery allegedly asked for permission to look
into the vehicle and received Mr. Marshall's
consent.
The trial judge found that Trooper Avery's
"investigation was reasonable in view of the
defendant's statements in regards to the
vehicle ownership and the driver's usage. The
destination itinerary would have put a reasonable officer on notice that something was
wrong." Although not directly so stating, the
judge, in substance, concluded that Trooper
Avery had reasonable suspicion to believe that
Mr. Marshall was involved in illegal conduct.
Although it is a close call, we agree with the
trial court's assessment of the reasonableness
of the detention.
We find that Trooper Avery's questioning
of Mr. Marshall as to conduct unrelated to the
traffic stop was justified because he had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Marshall was
engaged in a more serious crime. See Guzman,
864F.2datl519.
In conclusion, based on the totality of the
circumstances, we agree with the trial court
that Trooper Avery's ten-minute detention
and brief questioning of Mr. Marshall prior to
Mr. Marshall's alleged consent to search the
vehicle was not an unreasonable detention.
SEARCH
On appeal, Mr. Marshall argues that even if
his initial stop and subsequent detention were
not constitutionally deficient, the subsequent
search of the trunk of the vehicle and the
suitcases found in the trunk without a warrant
violated his fourth amendment rights. The
state contends, on the other hand, that Mr.
Marshall consented to the search of the trunk
and abandoned any privacy interest in the
suitcases and thus Trooper Avery's search of
the suitcases was constitutionally permissible.5
In our prior opinion, we focused solely on
whether the search of the suitcases was proper.
We found the warrantless search of the suitcases unconstitutional as we refused to allow
REPORTS
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the state to raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time on appeal. We
granted the state's petition for rehearing to reexamine the related fourth amendment issues
of voluntary consent and abandonment which
are central to a resolution of this appeal.
1. Standing
The state, in its original brief on appeal,
claimed Mr. Marshall was without standing to
challenge the seizure of the suitcases as he had
disclaimed any ownership or possessory interest in the suitcases during the search and thus
had no expectation of privacy in their contents. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 13850 (1978); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334,
1335 (Utah 1984); State v. Grueber, 116 P.2d
70, 73-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Stare v.
DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 196-97 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). The state relies upon the following
testimony from the preliminary hearing:
Q. [Defense Counsel] And what
was inside the trunk?
A. [Trooper Avery] There were
four suitcases.
Q. Did you ask if you could look
in those suitcases?
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of
all, I asked him what was in the
suitcases, and he told me, right
quickly, clothes. Then when I
looked at him again, he told me
that he didn't know where they
came from, they must have been in
there when he rented the car.
In our prior opinion, we relied on the Utah
Supreme Court decision of State v. Schlosser,
11A P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), which squarely
held that standing to challenge the validity of
a search under the fourth amendment "is not a
jurisdictional doctrine [but] is a substantive
doctrine that identifies those who may assert
rights against unlawful searches and seizures."
Id. at 1138. Citing the general rule that a
substantive issue or "claim of error cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal," the
supreme court deemed the issue of standing
waived. Id. at 1138-39.
The state attempts to distinguish Schlosser,
claiming that in that case the state not only
failed to raise the issue of standing in the
motion to suppress hearing, but also on appeal
and that here, unlike Schlosser, the state raises
standing simply as an alternative ground to
uphold the trial court's denial of the motion
to suppress.6 We do not find the distinction
determinative.7
The United States Supreme Court took the
same position in Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204 (1981), when it refused to allow the
government to raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time on appeal
to provide an alternative ground to sustain the
trial court's refusal to grant a motion to
suppress. The Court concluded:
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Aside from arguing that a search
warrant was not constitutionally
required, the Government was initially entitled to defend against
petitioner's charge of an unlawful
search by asserting that petitioner
lacked a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the searched home, or
that he consented to the search, or
that exigent circumstances justified
the e n t r y . The
Government,
however, may lose its right to raise
factual issues of this sort before this
Court when it has made contrary
assertions in the courts below, when
it has acquiesced in contrary findings by those courts, or when it has
failed to raise such questions in a
timely fashion during the litigation.
Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
The state, on petition for rehearing, contends that language in Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978) is contrary to our conclusion
that the state should not be allowed to raise
standing for the first time on appeal. We disagree. The language in Rakas relied upon by
the state is consistent with our view.
The proponent of a motion to
suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the
challenged search or seizure. The prosecutor argued that petitioners
lacked standing to challenge the
search because they did not own the
rifle, the shells or the automobile. Petitioners
did not contest
the
factual predicates of the prosecutor's argument and instead, simply
stated that they were not required
to prove ownership to object to the
search. The prosecutor's argument
gave petitioners notice that they
were to be put to their proof on any
issue as to which they had the
burden, and because of their failure
to assert ownership, we must
assume, for purposes of our review,
that petitioners do not own the rifle
or the shells.
Id. at 130 n.l (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
We agree with the state and Rakas that Mr.
Marshall has the ultimate burden of proof to
establish that his fourth amendment rights
were violated or, to put it otherwise, that he
had an expectation of privacy in the area
searched or the articles seized.8 Nevertheless,
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable
and the burden is on the state, in the first
instance, to show that a warrantless search is
lawful. State v. Christensen, 616 P.2d 408, 411
(Utah 1984).
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We believe Rakas is consistent with our view
hat the prosecutor, as part of the state's
jurden to establish the constitutionality of a
warrantless search, must give a defendant
"notice that he will be put to his proof" on the
ssue of fourth amendment standing. This can
oe done at any time during the hearing on a
defendant's motion to suppress as long as the
defendant has an opportunity to put on evidence to meet the claim.9 Once the defendant
tias been put on notice that the state claims
the warrantless search was constitutional
because he has no expectation of privacy in
the area searched, then the defendant must
factually demonstrate that he does have standing to contest the warrantless search. We
believe the Schlosser standing rule was fashiDned to protect the defendant from being
required to deal with new legal issues on
appeal when he had no warning of the necessity to develop the relevant facts below.
2. Consent/Abandonment
The state, on petition for rehearing, excuses
its failure to raise the issue of standing claiming that neither Mr, Marshall, the state nor
the trial judge focused on the search of the
suitcases in the motion to suppress hearing.
Rather, the state claims the hearing centered
on the pretextual nature of the stop, the unreasonable detention of Mr. Marshall and the
unlawful search of the trunk.
Mr. Marshall, on petition for rehearing,
claims the following comment made by
defense counsel sufficiently focused the proceeding on the search of the suitcases:
"Additionally there is no evidence that there
was consent to search the bags."
Upon a re-examination of the record, we
agree with the state that the parties and the
trial judge did not focus on the critical issue
of the search of the suitcases at the motion to
suppress hearing. The result is that the trial
judge did not make adequate findings of fact
on the issues of voluntary consent to search
the trunk or the suitcases and Mr. Marshall's
alleged abandonment of any privacy interest in
the suitcases, which the parties now agree are
pivotal on appeal. We therefore remand for a
rehearing on these critical issues. We nevertheless discuss the controlling law to guide the
trial court on rehearing.
A search is valid under the fourth amendment if it is conducted as a result of the defendant's voluntary consent. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, All U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v.
Sierra, ISA P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). "[T]he question {of] whether a consent
to a search was in fact 'voluntary* or was the
product of duress or coercion, express or
implied, is a question of fact to be determined
from the totality of all the circumstances."
Schneckloth, All U.S. at 227. "A trial court's
finding of voluntary consent will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous." United
States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130 (1st Cir.
UTAH ADVA

1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979).
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883
(10th Cir. 1977), the Tenth Circuit outlined
the specifics necessary for the government to
sustain its burden to show that voluntary
consent was given:
(1) There must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was
"unequivocal and specific" and
"freely and intelligently given"; (2)
the government must prove consent
was given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) the
courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights
and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived.
Id. at 885 (quoting Villano v. United States,
310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962)). See also
United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1453
(10th Cir. 1985). See generally State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State
v. Sierra, ISA P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents
to a search, the ensuing search must be limited
in scope to only the specific area agreed to by
defendant. "The scope of a consent search is
limited by the breadth of the actual consent
itself .... Any police activity that transcends
the actual scope of the consent given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the
suspect." United States v. Gay, 77A F.2d 368,
377 (10th Cir. 1985); see, e.g., People v.
Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984) (scope
of consent exceeded when police asked to
"look around" the house, then conducted a 45minute search of rooms, drawers, boxes and
closed containers).
The trial court made the following conclusory finding on the issue of Mr. Marshall's
consent: "The Defendant consented to the
search. There was no evidence of duress or
coercion." This conclusory finding on consent
is not particularly helpful in determining
whether Mr. Marshall's consent was
"unequivocal and specific" as it does not detail
what Mr. Marshall agreed could be searched—
the interior of the passenger compartment, the
trunk, or the locked suitcases.10 Furthermore,
the relevant portions from the transcript of
Trooper Avery's testimony are troubling:
Q. [Defense Counsel] What were
the words he [sic] used when you
asked him to search his vehicle?
A. [Trooper Avery] I asked Mr.
Marshall if—if there were a n y if there was any-were there any
drugs in the vehicle, and he took
two or three seconds-no, wait a
minute, I guess-I first asked him
REPORTS
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the finding is consistent with the standard
required for a voluntary consent. See United
States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir.
1977); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980-81
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Likewise, the court in
its findings fails to focus on the search of the
locked suitcases and the issues of voluntary
consent or abandonment.
Even if we were to accept the state's argument that the undisputed facts support a
finding that Mr. Marshall abandoned11 any
expectation of privacy in the suitcases by his
ambiguous disclaimer of ownership and that
the state should be allowed to raise this fourth
amendment standing issue for the first time on
appeal, we would be unable to dispose of this
case on the record before us. The state, in its
petition for rehearing, correctly points out that
"a loss of standing to challenge a search
cannot be brought about by illegal police
conduct." United States v. Labat, 696 F.
Supp. 1419,1425 (D. Kan. 1988).
Thus, we would have to determine if the
search of the trunk was illegal or was a result
of a voluntary consent. This we cannot do on
the record before us.
Even if we determined the search of the
trunk was unlawful, the "defendant must show
a nexus between the allegedly unlawful police
conduct and the abandonment of the property." Id. at 1426. See, e.g., United States v.
Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1982), cert,
denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (While "an unconstitutional seizure or arrest which prompts a
Q. And how did you get in the
disclaimer of property vitiates that act," id. at
trunk?
1045, the court found the defendant's disclaA. I asked him, I said-asked
imer was not precipitated by improper
him if he had the key to the trunk
conduct. Id. at 1048.); United States v.
and he says yes, and I says—and
Oilman, 684 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Cir. 1982)
I asked him if he'[d] open it, which
("There must be a nexus between the allegedly
he did, he tried. He was extremely
unlawful police conduct and abandonment of
nervous at the time. I—
property if the challenged evidence is to be
Q. So did you open the trunk?
suppressed."); United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d
A. No, sir, I did not. He-he
726, 730 (5th Cir. 1979) (if there is a nexus
could not-there was a little latch
between unlawful police conduct and the disover the key hole. He was shaking
covery of evidence, the court should suppress
so hard, he couldn't even hold the
the evidence). See generally Search and
latch open, so I held the latch up
Seizure: What Constitutes Abandonment of
for him so he could insert the key.
Without the assistance of specific findings Personal Property within Rule that Search and
of fact, we cannot resolve the difficult issue of Seizure of Abandoned Property Is Not Unrewhether Mr. Marshall's opening the trunk asonable-Modern Cases, 40 A.L.R.4th 381
constituted implied consent to search the trunk (1985). Again, there is no finding on this
under the totality of the circumstances prese- crucial issue.
Therefore, we reverse and remand this intnted. See United States v. Almand, 565 F.2d
927, 930 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 824 erlocutory appeal for a rehearing on Mr.
(1978) (voluntary consent found where defe- Marshall's motion to suppress on the limited
ndant silently reached into his pocket, issues of whether Mr. Marshall voluntarily
removed key, then unlocked and opened consented to the search of the trunk or the
suitcases, whether Mr. Marshall abandoned
camper door).
Furthermore, the record creates a substan- any privacy interest in the suitcases and thus
tial question as to whether the court's general lacks standing to challenge their search, and
finding that there was "no evidence of duress finally, if the trial court finds there was an
or coercion" was intended to apply to the illegal search of the trunk or suitcases,
search of the trunk or, even if it was, whether whether there is a sufficient nexus between
that illegal search and Mr. Marshall's abanCE
REPORTS
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if he was carrying any weapons and
he told me no. I then asked him if
he was carrying any-if there was
any alcohol in the vehicle, he said
that he did not drink. I recall both
answers were quite quick. And then
I asked him if there were any drugs
in the vehicle, he paused for, you
know, probably two or three
seconds, and then told me no. I
then asked him if it would be okay
if I looked in the vehicle, search the
vehicle, and he said go ahead.
Q. Now, did you ask if you could
look in the vehicle, or did you ask
if you could search the vehicle?
A. Well, according to this [his
report], I said-I asked if I could
look in the vehicle.
Q. So, it was "look in the vehicle"?
You didn't ask if you could open
anything inside the vehicle or anything else, did you?
A. No. I just asked if I could look
in the vehicle.
Q. And what happened then?
A. Mr. Marshall just told me, you
know, he said go right ahead. He
got out, gathered up his papers and
we walked up to the front of the
vehicle, and he had to open the
passenger door, as I recall.

CODE • CO
Provo, Utah

State v. Marshall
132 Utah Adv. Rep. 45

donment, if any, of his expectation of privacy
in the suitcases.
Judith M. Billings, Judge

(suspicion of defective turn signals justified stop);
State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224, 224 (Me. 1989) (stop
justified when blinking headlights led officer to stop
vehicle for safety reasons).
4. We do not analyze this issue under article I,
WE CONCUR:
section 14 of the Utah Constitution as the state
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
constitutional issue was not sufficiently particularNorman H. Jackson, Judge
•This opinion issued on Petition for Rehearing ized below nor is a reasoned analysis provided on
appeal as to why our analysis should be different
replaces the opinion of the same name issued
under Utah's constitution. See State v. Johnson,
on December 26, 1989.
111 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
5. The state does not argue that Trooper Avery had
1. Utah appellate courts have consistently required probable cause to search either the car or the suitcdetailed findings of fact to support a judgment ases. We, therefore, need not deal with the troublentered by a trial judge in civil cases. Rucker v. esome issue of whether probable cause to search an
Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979) ("The automobile is sufficient under the automobile exceimportance of complete, accurate and consistent ption to search a locked suitcase found in the trunk
findings of fact in a case tried by a judge is essential of a car. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
to the resolution of dispute under the proper rule of 798 (1982) (if probable cause exists, police can
law. To that end the findings should be sufficiently search closed containers found in vehicle); Arkansas
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to dis- v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (warrantless search
close the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi invalid);
each factual issue was reached/); Sampson v. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002-03 (Utah a . App. (warrantless search of a footlocker found in the
1989) (findings of fact must indicate the "mind of trunk of a vehicle invalid); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d
the court." (quoting Parlrs v. Zions First Nat'l 264, 272 n.l (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring separately) (criticizing the Ross holding).
Bank, 673 P.2d 590,601 (Utah 1983)).
Detailed findings of fact likewise greatly ease the 6. Prior to Schlosser, the Utah Supreme Court had,
burden of an appellate court in its review of a trial in several cases, considered standing for the first
court's decision on a motion to suppress. This is time on appeal and had utilized the doctrine to
particularly true where multiple issue are presented refuse to consider the constitutional validity of a
in the motion to suppress. 4 W. LaFave, Search & challenged search. See, e.g., State v. Constantino,
Seizure §11.2, at 252 (1987) [hereinafter "LaFave"] 732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987) (per curiam)
(citing State v. Johnson, 16 Or. App. 560, 519 P.2d (court did not address whether the issue of standing
1053, 1058-59 (1974)). Many jurisdictions require had been raised below, but stated that defendant
specific findings of fact on all motions to suppress. could not assert any expectation of privacy in
See LaFave at §11.2 n.188. We believe the requir- vehicle because he did not own vehicle and had
presented no testimony that he had permission of
ement a sound one.
2. While the warning citation does not specify which owner or had borrowed vehicle "under circumstaprovision of the Utah Code Mr. Marshall violated, nces that would imply permissive use"); State v.
the state asserts that his conduct was in violation of Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Utah 1986) (State
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-117(1) (1988) which, below argued there was consent by defendant's exwife to search his mother's trailer. On appeal, the
with our emphasis, provides:
state argued defendant had no possessory or propIt is a misdemeanor for any person to
rietary interest in the trailer and thus had no expedrive or move or for the owner to cause
ctation of privacy. The court declined to reach the
or knowingly permit to be driven or
issue of consent because it found that defendant
moved on any highway any vehicle or
lacked standing to object to the search because the
combination of vehicles which is in such
stipulated evidence did not show that defendant
unsafe condition as to endanger any
shared ownership, use or possession of the trailer.);
person, or which does not contain those
State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984)
parts or is not at all times equipped with
(At trial, the defendant produced evidence that
lamps and other equipment in proper
neither the attache case in which the evidence was
condition and adjustment....
found nor the vehicle belonged to the defendant.
The court did not address whether the issue of sta3. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61 nding was raised below, but declined to reach the
(1979), the United States Supreme Court stated that question of the validity of the search because the
an officer has a duty in the interest of highway defendant conceded he did not own the case or the
safety to stop vehicles for safety reasons. "Many vehicle and had failed to show any expectation of
violations of minimum vehicle-safety requirements privacy.). In these earlier cases, it is sometimes
are observable, and something can be done about unclear whether the Utah Supreme Court raised the
them by the observing officer, directly and immed- issue of standing sua sponte on appeal or permitted
iately." Id. at 660. The Court inferred that as long the state to raise the issue of standing for the first
as an officer suspects the driver is violating "any time on appeal. We assume that Schlosser supercone of the multitude of applicable traffic and equi- edes these earlier cases and thus do not follow them.
pment regulations," the police officer may legally 7. Although the Utah Supreme Court refused to
stop the vehicle. Id. at 661. See Townsel v. State, allow standing to be utilized to attack the trial
763 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (court court's granting of a motion to suppress in Schloheld stop justified when vehicle's headlight was out, sser, the court relied on State v. Goodman, 42
a tail light was broken, the license plate and Wash. App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985), which held
windows were obscured, and speeding); State v. the state could not raise the issue of standing for the
Puig, 112 Ariz. 519, 544 P.2d 201, 202 (1975) first time on appeal to provide an alternative ground
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for sustaining the trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress. Id. at 1060.
8. However, the failure of the state to challenge Mr.
Marshall's standing at the suppression hearing did
not give Mr. Marshall an opportunity to assert his
expectation of privacy. See Combs v. United States,
408 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1972) (per curiam) (Where
petitioner's failure to assert an expectation of
privacy may have been explained by the Government's failure to challenge standing either at the
suppression hearing or at trial, the United States
Supreme Court remanded to the district court for
further proceedings to allow petitioner to establish a
privacy interest.).
9. The defendant's testimony at the motion to
suppress hearing cannot be used against the defendant at trial. See Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (prosecutor cannot use a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing as
substantive evidence of guilt at trial unless defendant makes no objection). We note, however, that
the United States Supreme Court had not decided
whether the Simmons rule precludes the use of a
defendant's suppression hearing testimony to
impeach the defendant's testimony at trial. See
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 94 & n.9
(1980).
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the importance of detailed findings on
a motion to suppress.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169,
1173 (10th Cir. 1983) (Court found abandonment
when police initially saw defendant running with a
brown satchel, however, when they captured defendant, he did not have the satchel and disavowed
knowledge of it. Police later found the satchel
outside the building and searched it.); United States
v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199, 202 (9th Cir. 1981), cert,
denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982) (court found abandonment where the defendant, after picking up the
luggage at the claim area, produced a mismatched
baggage claim check, told agents that his name was
not on the luggage name tag, and allowed the agents
to return the luggage to the claim area, thus giving
the agents the impression that he had no interest in
the luggage); United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d
1217, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456
U.S. 946 (1982) (court found abandonment where
the defendant disclaimed ownership of a wallet
found on the seat of the vehicle); United States v.
Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc)
(court found abandonment when defendants disclaimed ownership of suitcases and began to walk
away from them).
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IN T H E
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
Carl N. SMITH and Dawna La Verne Smith,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
LINMAR ENERGY CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation,
Defendant and Appellee.
No. 880661-CA
FILED: April 19, 1990
Seventh District, Duchesne County
Honorable Dennis L. Draney
ATTORNEYS:
Gordon A. Madsen and Robert C. Cummings,
Salt Lake City, for Appellants
Robert W, Adkins and Terry L. Christiansen,
Coalville, for Appellee
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Billings.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Plaintiffs/appellants Carl N. Smith and
Dawna LaVerne Smith ("Smiths") appeal from
a money judgment in their favor. The Smiths
claim the trial court incorrectly assessed the
damages due them as a result of the defendant/
appellee Linmar Energy Corporation's
("Linmar Energy") placement of an oil well,
battery storage tank, and road on the Smiths'
property pursuant to an oil and gas lease. We
affirm.
The Smiths are owners of a fee interest in
20 acres of land located adjacent to the city
limits of Altamont in Duchesne County.
Linmar Energy is the lessee under an oil and
gas lease covering this property. The Smiths'
20-acre tract, including the land now occupied by the well site, has been used exclusively
for agricultural purposes. The Smiths' property is located in the Altamont-Bluebell oil
field and is surrounded by numerous oil wells,
some of which may be seen from the Smith
property.
In 1983, Linmar Energy, pursuant to its
lease, entered onto the southwest corner of the
Smiths' 20-acre parcel to install an oil well
along with an oil well battery and storage
tanks. Linmar Energy also constructed an
access road from the county road on the north
to the well site. Linmar Energy occupied 4.76
acres of the 20-acre parcel.
Linmar Energy considered several other
alternative locations for the well site, but rejected the other sites based on geological and
economic factors. Prior to construction of the
well site, Linmar Energy's representative
contacted Carl Smith and met him on the
REPORTS
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debt.
Yoho states that his credit manager handled
the document at issue, and that Yoho had
never seen it until his deposition in this action.
He does not, however, dispute Shillington's
estimate of the date on which the guaranty
agreement was executed. Yoho merely states
that he discussed the financial arrangements
with one of Shillington's employees, who said
that Shillington had agreed to guaranty
payment. Although Yoho never discussed the I
agreement with Shillington personally, he
insists that no goods would have been delivered to RTEM prior to such an agreement
from Shillington.
A review of this evidence in the light most
favorable to Shillington indicates that the
written guaranty was not executed until after
the goods had been delivered. This leaves as a
genuine question of material fact whether the
document is merely a memorialization of a
parol agreement made between the parties or
their agents prior to the delivery of the goods,
or a gratuitous promise made thereafter.
Without a previous parol agreement, the
signed document may be unenforceable. See
Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 628,
633 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("Events which
occur prior to the making of the promise and
not with the purpose of inducing the promise
in exchange are viewed as 'past consideration*
and are the legal equivalent of 'no consideration.'") (quoting 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts §210 (1963)).
Although the trial court did not articulate
its reasoning behind the grant of summary
judgment, only one material fact in dispute is
required to reverse a summary judgment. See
Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342, 343 (Utah
1978). Since we hold that the existence of a
parol agreement is one such unresolved material fact, we reverse the summary judgment
and remand the case for trial or other proceedings.2
Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
J. Robert Bullock, Judge
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting
by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989).
2. We make no pronouncement on the applicability
of the statute of frauds, Utah Code Ann. §§25-54(2),-6 (Supp. 1989 & 1989), an issue not raised by
the parties.
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Gregory MARSHALL,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 890121-CA
FILED: December 26,1989
Seventh District, Sevier County
Honorable Don V. Tibbs
ATTORNEYS:
Jerold D. McPhee and Kristine K. Smith, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt
Lake City, for Respondent
Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and
Jackson.
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal
BILLINGS, Judge:
The appellant, Gregory J. Marshall ("Mr.
Marshall"), was charged with possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to distribute for value, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8
(1989). Mr. Marshall filed a pre-trial motion
to suppress the 140 pounds of marijuana
seized from the rental car he was driving when
he was arrested. The trial court denied Mr.
Marshall's motion and he filed this interlocutory appeal. We reverse.
We recite the facts surrounding the seizure
of the contraband in detail as the legal issues
presented are fact sensitive. State v. Sierra,
754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery
("Trooper Avery") was driving on Interstate
70 near Salina, Utah. He noticed Mr. Marshall's vehicle in the left-hand lane passing a
motor home. Trooper Avery observed that
Mr. Marshall's turn signal remained blinking
for approximately two miles after he passed
the motor home. Not knowing whether Mr.
Marshall's signal was malfunctioning or
whether Mr. Marshall had negligently left the
signal on, Trooper Avery pulled the vehicle
over to inform Mr. Marshall of the problem
and to give him a warning ticket. Trooper
Avery had issued similar warning citations for
turn signal violations approximately five to ten
times in the previous six-month period.
Prior to stopping Mr. Marshall, Trooper
Avery noticed the vehicle had California
license plates. He approached Mr. Marshall's
vehicle and informed Mr. Marshall of the turn
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signal problem. Mr. Marshall responded that
he had been having "a hard time keeping the
thing turned off."
Trooper Avery asked Mr. Marshall for his
driver's license and vehicle registration. Mr.
Marshall produced a New York driver's
license and a California rental agreement for
the vehicle. Mr. Marshall said he was going
siding in Denver and planned to return the car
to San Diego, California. However, the rental
agreement indicated that the car would be
returned in New York infivedays.
Trooper Avery acknowledged he became
suspicious that Mr. Marshall might be transporting drugs. Trooper Avery asked Mr.
Marshall to return with him to his patrol car
where he issued a warning citation for "Lights,
head, tail, other." Trooper Avery then returned Mr. Marshall's driver's license and the
rental agreement.
Trooper Avery next asked Mr. Marshall if
he was carrying alcohol, drugs or firearms.
Mr. Marshall stated he was not. Trooper
Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if he could
"look inside the vehicle." Mr. Marshall responded, "Go anead." Trooper Avery and Mr.
Marshall walked back to Mr. Marshall's
vehicle. The passenger door was locked and
Mr. Marshall reached in on the driver's side
to open the door. Trooper Avery noticed a
small red bag on the floor of the vehicle and
asked if he could open it. Mr. Marshall
agreed. No contraband was found inside the
bag or the passenger compartment of the
vehicle.
Trooper Avery then asked if Mr. Marshall
had a key to the trunk and if Mr. Marshall
would open the trunk. Mr. Marshall attempted
to open the trunk, but was shaking so badly
that Trooper Avery had to assist him by
holding the key latch cover up while Mr.
Marshall inserted the key. Trooper Avery saw
four padlocked suitcases when Mr. Marshall
opened the trunk. Trooper Avery asked Mr.
Marshall what the suitcases contained and Mr.
Marshall responded "clothes*" Trooper Avery
then asked if he could look in the suitcases.
Mr. Marshall immediately reversed his statement and responded that the suitcases were
not his and must have already been in the
trunk when he, rented the vehicle. Trooper
Avery testified there was some play in the
zipper of one bag and he unzipped it far
enough to see a green leafy substance. Trooper
Avery then arrested Mr. Marshall for possession of a controlled substance.
Mr. Marshall did not testify or present any
evidence to contradict Trooper Avery's testimony during the hearing below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"[W]e will not disturb the trial court's
factual evaluation underlying its decision to
grant or deny a motion to suppress unless it is
clearly erroneous." State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d
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972, 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). See also State
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); State
v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989). Further, "[tjhe trial court's
finding is clearly erroneous only if it is against
the clear weight of the evidence or if [the
appellate court] reach[es] a definite and firm
conviction that-a mistake has been made." State
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
STANDING-EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY
The state argues that we need not reach the
issues asserted by Mr. Marshall that Trooper
Avery's stop of Mr. Marshall was an unconstitutional pretext, or that his consequent
detention exceeded constitutional limits, or
that Mr. Marshall did not voluntarily consent
to the search of the suitcases found in the
trunk of his rental car. As a threshold argument, the state claims that Mr. Marshall lacks
standing to challenge the seizure of the suitcases as he disclaimed any ownership or possessory interest in the suitcases both during the
search and subsequent to his arrest and, thus,
had no expectation of privacy in their contents.* See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 13850 (1978); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334,
1335 (Utah 1984); State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d
70, 73-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v.
DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 196-97 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987).
The fatal problem with the state's argument
is the state raises standing for the first time on
appeal. The Utah Supreme Court recently
squarely held that standing to challenge the
validity of a search under the fourth amendment "is not a jurisdictional doctrine [but] is a
substantive doctrine that identifies those who
may assert rights against unlawful searches
and seizures." State v. Schlosser, 114 P.2d
1132, 1138 (Utah 1989). Citing the general rule
that a substantive issue or "claim of error
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,"
the court deemed the issue of standing waived.
Id. at 1138-39.
The state attempts to distinguish Schlosser,
claiming that in Schlosser the state not only
failed to raise the issue of standing in the
motion to suppress hearing, but also on
appeal. We do not find the distinction determinative. We believe the Schlosser standing
rule was fashioned to protect the defendant
from being required to deal with new legal
issues on appeal when he had no warning of
the necessity to develop the relevant facts
below.
In this case, the state, the defendant, and
the trial court all focused on the issue of voluntary consent to search the suitcases, not
standing to assert a privacy interest in the
suitcases. The defendant may well have chosen
to testify at the motion to suppress hearing to
contradict the trooper's testimony that he had
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disclaimed ownership of the suitcases had the
state chosen to litigate the issue of standing
below.
In Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204
(1981), the United States Supreme Court also
refused to allow the government to raise the
issue of fourth amendment standing for the
first time on appeal. The Court refused to
allow the state to claim that the defendant had
no expectation of privacy in the house searched as a ground for sustaining the lower
court's ruling denying a motion to suppress
when the state had not made this claim at
trial. The Court concluded:
The Government, however, may
lose its right to raise factual issues
of this sort before this Court when
it has made contrary assertions in
the courts below, when it has acquiesced in contrary findings by
those courts, or when it has failed
to raise such questions in a timely
fashion during the litigation.
Id. at 209.
Thus, we conclude that the state may not
for the first time on appeal claim that Mr.
Marshall lacks standing to assert a privacy
interest in the contraband seized to uphold the
trial court's denial of the motion to suppress.2
PRETEXT STOP
Initially, Mr. Marshall contends Trooper
Avery used the fact that his turn signal was
malfunctioning as a pretext to stop his vehicle
to search for evidence of drug trafficking.
The protective shield of the fourth amendment applies when an officer stops an automobile on the highway and detains its occupants. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988). A police officer may constitutionally stop a citizen on two alternative
grounds. First, the stop "could be based on
specific, articulable facts which, together with
rational inferences drawn from those facts,
would lead a reasonable person to conclude
[defendant] had committed or was about to
commit a crime." Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v. Christensen,
676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)).
Second, the police officer can "stop an automobile for a traffic violation committed in the
officer's presence." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977.
However, an officer may not use a traffic
violation stop as a pretext to search for evidence of a more serious crime. Id.
To determine if Trooper Avery stopped Mr.
Marshall's vehicle to investigate his hunch
that Mr. Marshall's vehicle was involved in
drug trafficking, we determine whether a
hypothetical reasonable officer, in view of the
totality of the circumstances confronting him
or her, would have stopped Mr. Marshall to
issue a warning for failing to terminate a turn
UTAH

signal. Id. at 978.
Mr. Marshall claims Trooper Avery's stop
of his vehicle is similar to the stop we found
unconstitutional in Sierra. We disagree. In
Sierra, the basis articulated for the stop was
that the driver remained in the left lane too
long after passing a car. In this case, Trooper
Avery perceived an equipment problem with
Mr. Marshall's car. Either his turn signal was
malfunctioning or he had negligently failed to
turn it off.3 Courts consistently have held that
a police officer can stop a car when he or she
believes the car's safety equipment is not
functioning properly.4
Furthermore, unlike the officer in Sierra,
Trooper Avery was not suspicious of Mr.
Marshall for other reasons before the stop,
had not followed him in order to find some
reason to pull him over, and, before the
alleged violation occurred, had not radioed for
help thereby indicating he intended to stop the
vehicle.
In conclusion, we find Trooper Avery's
stop of Mr. Marshall's vehicle was not a
pretext, but was a valid exercise of police
authority to make certain Mr. Marshall's
vehicle was functioning properly.
UNREASONABLE DETENTION
Next, Mr. Marshall complains generally that
the extent of his detention and the scope of
Trooper Avery's investigation exceeded constitutional limits.5 Again, we disagree.
Once a driver is lawfully stopped, an officer
may inquire as to information about the driver
and the vehicle "reasonably related in scope to
the justification" for the detention. United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881
(1975) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29
(1968)).
The United States Supreme Court has not
chosen to define a bright-line rule as to the
acceptable length of a detention because
"common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria." United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985).
The Court has chosen to focus, not on the
length of the detention alone, but on "whether
the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel
their suspicions quickly, during which time it
was necessary to detain the defendant." Id. at
686.
In Sharpe, the Court found that a twentyminute detention after a highway stop for
suspected drug trafficking was not excessive
where the officer examined the driver's
license, examined his ownership papers, requested and was denied permission to search
the camper, and then stepped on the rear
bumper, noting that it did not move, thus
confirming his suspicion that it was overloaded. Id. at 687. The Court distinguished this
reasonable detention from those involved in
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979);'
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Honda v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); and
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983),
stating that it was not the length of detention,
but the events which occurred during the detention which transformed the investigative
stops in these cases into a "defacto arrest.'' Id.
at 683-86.*
Trooper Avery wrote out the warning citation within ten minutes of stopping Mr.
Marshall. Based upon the facts obtained
during routine questioning and issuing the
warning citation, the officer became suspicious
that Mr. Marshall was involved in transporting
drugs. He returned Mr. Marshall's driver's
license, the car rental agreement and the citation. Trooper Avery then asked Mr. Marshall
if he was carrying weapons, alcohol, or drugs
in the vehicle. Mr. Marshall responded he was
not. Then Trooper Avery immediately asked
for permission to look into the vehicle and
received Mr. Marshall's consent.
We find that Trooper Avery's initial investigation was within the scope of his traffic
stop and that Trooper Avery's immediate
request to search the vehicle and his expeditious completion of the search did not constitute an unreasonable detention. Furthermore,
Mr. Marshall was not moved to another location nor treated in a manner to support a
finding of a "defacto arrest."
CONSENT
Finally, Mr. Marshall argues that even if his
initial stop and subsequent detention were not
constitutionally deficient, the subsequent
search of the suitcases found in the trunk of
the vehicle without a warrant violated his
fourth amendment rights. The state contends,
on the other hand, that Mr. Marshall consented to the search of the suitcases and thus
Trooper Avery's search of the suitcases and
subsequent seizure of the marijuana without a
search warrant was constitutionally permissible. ?
A search is valid under the fourth amendment if it is conducted as a result of the defendant's voluntary consent. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v.
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). "[TJhe question [of] whether a consent
to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the
product of duress or coercion, express or
implied, is a question of fact to be determined
from the totality of all the circumstances."
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. "A trial court's
finding of voluntary consent will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous." United
States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 113a (1st Cir.
1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979).
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883
(10th Cir. 1977), the Tenth Circuit outlined
the specifics necessary for the government to
sustain its burden to show that voluntary
consent was given:
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(1) There must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was
"unequivocal and specific" and
"freely and intelligently given"; (2)
the government must prove consent
was given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) the
courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights
and there must be convincing evidence that suchrightswere waived.
Id. at 885 (quoting Villano v. United States,
310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962)). See also
United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1453
(10th Cir. 1985). See generally State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State
v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents
to a search, the ensuing search must be limited
in scope to only the specific area agreed to by
defendant. "The scope of a consent search is
limited by the breadth of the actual consent
itself .... Any police activity that transcends
the actual scope of the consent given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the
suspect." United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368,
377 (10th Cir. 1985); see, e.g., People v.
Thwet, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984) (scope
of consent exceeded when police asked to
"look around" the house, then conducted a 45minute search of rooms, drawers, boxes and
closed containers).
The trial court made the following finding
on the issue of Mr. Marshall's consent: "The
Defendant consented to the search. There was
no evidence of duress or coercion." This
conclusory finding on consent is not particularly helpful in determining whether Mr.
Marshall's consent was "unequivocal and
specific" as it does not detail what Mr. Marshall agreed could be searched-the interior
of the passenger compartment, the trunk, or
the locked suitcases. The relevant portions
from the transcript of Trooper Avery's testimony are more enlightening:
Q. What were the words he [sicJ
used when you asked him to search
his vehicle?
A. I asked Mr. Marshall if—if
there were any-if there was any-were there any drugs in the
vehicle, and he took two or three
seconds—no, wait a minute, I
guess-I first asked him if he was
carrying any weapons and he told
me no. I then asked him if he was
carrying any-if there was any
alcohol in the vehicle, he said that
he did not drink. I recall both
answers were quite quick. And then
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I asked him if there were any drugs
in the vehicle, he paused for, you
know, probably two or three
seconds, and then told me no. I
then asked him if it would be okay
if I looked in the vehicle, search the
vehicle, and he said go ahead.
Q. Now, did you ask if you could
look in the vehicle, or did you ask
if you could search the vehicle.
A. Well, according to this [his
report], I said-I asked if I could
look in the vehicle.
Q. So, it was "look in the
vehicle"?
You didn't ask if you could open
anything inside the vehicle or anything else, did you?
A. No. I just asked if I could
look in the vehicle.
Q. And what happened then?
A. Mr. Marshall just told me,
you know, he said go right ahead.
He got out, gathered up his papers
and we walked up to the front of
the vehicle, and he had to open the
passenger door, as I recall.
Q. And how did you get in the
trunk?
A. I asked him, I said-asked
him if he had the key to the trunk
and he says yes, and I says-and
I asked him if he's [sic] open it,
which he did, he tried. He was
extremely nervous at the time. I Q. So did you open the trunk?
A. No, sir, I did not. He-he
could not-there was a little latch
over the key hole. He was shaking
so hard, he couldn't even hold the
latch open, so I held the latch up
for him so he could insert the key.
Q. And what was inside the
trunk?
A. There were four suitcases.
Q. Did you ask if you could look
in those suitcases?
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of
all, I asked him what was in the
suitcases, and he told me, right
quickly, clothes. Then when I
looked at him again, he told me
that he didn't know where they
came from, they must have been in
there when he rented the car.
Q. At that point, you opened the
suitcases?
A. Couldn't open them, they
were padlocked shut.
Q. So, you broke the lock?
A. No. I~one part could zip
open a little ways, and I opened it-or unzipped it, far enough where
I could see the contents of one bag.
UTAH A

Q. And you didn't ask permission to look inside the suitcases, did
you?
A. I don't recall if I asked specifically to look inside those, no.
Q. So, to look inside the suitcases, you were based on the permission to look inside the vehicle; is
that correct?
A. Well, I retract that. His first
response was clothes when I asked
him what it was, and then I asked
him if I could look in the suitcases,
and he told me, well, they're not
mine, they must have been in the
trunk when I rented the car. So,
yes, he did say they weren't his.
Q. If they weren't his, how come
you charged him with the crime?
A. He told me they weren't his,
that's what he said. He said g o when I askedQ. But you didn't ever get permission from him to search the
suitcases, did you? And at that
point, you had them out of the
vehicle; is that correct?
A. Uh huh (affirmative). I took
one out.
Q. And it was locked?
A. Uh huh (affirmative).
Q. And you had to work around
the lock to look inside?
A. Well, there was a little play in
it, enough where you could see
inside.
Q. And to look inside the suitcase, you were basing the permission to look inside the vehicle?
A. Yes.
Mr. Marshall contends that Trooper
Avery's request to "look in the car" did not
constitute a request to search the vehicle. We
disagree. Mr. Marshall gave his consent, although not precisely phrased as consent "to
search," then stood by while the trooper searched the passenger compartment of the
vehicle. "Failure to object to the continuation
of the search under these circumstances may
be considered an indication that the search
was within the scope of consent." United
States v. Espinoza, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th
Cir. 1986); see also United States v. CorralCorral, 702 F. Supp. 1539, 1544 (D. Wyo.
1988).
Because of our holding, we need not reach
the more difficult issue of whether Mr. Marshall's opening the trunk constituted implied
consent to search the trunk under the totality
of the circumstances presented. See United
States v. Ahnand, 565 F.2d 927, 930 (5th
Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978)
(voluntary consent found where defendant
silently reached into his pocket, removed key,
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then unlocked and opened camper door).
Mr. Marshall did not consent to Trooper
Avery's search of the locked suitcases. The
state does not argue that Mr. Marshall's
consent to search the trunk should be construed to include locked suitcases found in the
trunk.8 Rather, the state argues that his disclaimer of ownership of the suitcases should be
construed to validate the search. We agree that
Mr. Marshall made a somewhat ambiguous
disclaimer of ownership of the four suitcases
found in the trunk of the vehicle, but he did
not give his consent to their search.9 The state
has not referred us to any case where a disclaimer of ownership has been held to be a
voluntary consent to search. The cases approving the subsequent search of a suitcase after
disclaimer of ownership have all turned on the
threshold issue of standing or abandonment,
not consent.10 We refuse to rely on this authority as it would allow the state to circumvent
the teachings of State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d
1132 (Utah 1989), and allow the state to raise
the issue of fourth amendment standing for
the first time on appeal by way of the back
door.
In summary, we reverse the trial court's
denial of the motion to suppress as Mr. Marshall did not consent-in-fact11 to the search
of the locked suitcases found in the trunk of
his vehicle.
Judith M. Billings, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. The state relies upon the following testimony
from the preliminary hearing:
Q. And what was inside the trunk?
A. There were four suitcases.
Q. Did you ask if you could look in
those suitcases?
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of all, I
asked him what was in the suitcases, and
he told me, right quickly, clothes. Then
when I looked at him again, he told me
that he didn't know where they came
from, they must have been in there
when he rented the car.
2. Our conclusion may seem at odds with the
general rule that we "may affirm the trial court's
decision on any proper grounds, even though the
trial court assigned another reason for its ruling."
State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985). We
agree with the general rule, but find the issue of
fourth amendment standing to be unique. Fourth
amendment standing involves more than simply
applying another legal principle to sustain an evidentiary ruling. The failure to raise a fourth amendment standing claim is more analogous to the failure
to plead and try an affirmative defense or an
attempt to assert a new theory of recovery for the
first time on appeal. See Bangerter v. Poulton, 663
P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983) ("It is axiomatic that
defenses and claims not raised by the parties in the
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trial cannot be considered for the first time on
appeal."); State v. Johnson, 711 P.2cl 326, 327-28
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (defendant cannot raise constitutional issues for-first time on appeal); Sampson
v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1005 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(defendant cannot raise affirmative defense for first
time on appeal); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799,
801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("matters not raised in the
pleadings nor put in issue at the trial may not be
raised for the first time on appeal."); Conder v.
A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 637
n,2 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (matters not presented to
trial court prior to summary judgment cannot be
raised for first time on appeal). The state asserts
fourth amendment standing to validate what otherwise would be an unconstitutional search. The defendant must have an opportunity to factually meet
this defense to an unconstitutional search.
Furthermore, although the Utah Supreme Court
applied the waiver of fourth amendment standing
rule to uphold the trial court's granting of a motion
to suppress in Schlosser, the court relied On State v.
Goodman, 42 Wash. App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057
(1985), which held the state could not raise the issue
of standing for the first time on appeal to provide
an alternative ground for sustaining the trial court's
denial of a motion to suppress. I d at 1060.
3. While the warning citation does not specify which
provision of the Utah Code Mr. Marshall violated,
the state asserts that his conduct was in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-117(1) (1988) which,
with our emphasis, provides:
It is a misdemeanor for any person to
drive or move or for the owner to cause
or knowingly permit to be driven or
moved on any highway any vehicle or
combination of vehicles which is in such
unsafe condition as to endanger any
person, or which does not contain those
parts or is not at all times equipped with
lamps and other equipment in proper
condition and adjustment....
4. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61
(1979), the United States Supreme Court stated that
an officer has a duty in the interest of highway
safety to stop vehicles for safety reasons. "Many
violations of minimum vehicle-safety requirements
are observable, and something can be done about
them by the observing officer, directly and immediately." Id. at 660. The Court inferred that as long
as an officer suspects the driver is violating "any
one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations," the police officer may legally
stop the vehicle. Id. at 661. See Townsel v. State,
763 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (court
held stop justified when vehicle's headlight was out,
a tail light was broken, the license plate and
windows were obscured, and speeding); State v.
Puig, 112 Ariz. 519, 544 P.2d 201, 202 (1975)
(suspicion of defective turn signals justified stop);
State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224, 224 (Me. 1989) (stop
justified when blinking headlights led officer to stop
vehicle for safety reasons).
5. We do not analyze this issue under article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution as the state
constitutional issue was not sufficiently particularized below nor is a reasoned analysis provided on
appeal as to why our analysis should be different
under Utah's constitution. See State v. Johnson,
771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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6. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)
Cite as
(defendant taken from neighbor's home, transpo124 Utah Adv. Rep. 66
rted unwillingly to police station, was subjected to
custodial interrogation for one hour until he made
IN THE
incriminating statements); Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491 (1983) (defendant stopped at airport, his
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
luggage seized, then he was taken to a small room
where he was questioned and his luggage inspected); George "Nick" KIRK,
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(defendant stopped at airport, his luggage seized for
v.
90 minutes to take it to narcotics detection dog for
"sniff test," police knew of arrival time and should STATE OF UTAH and its subdivision, the
Department of Corrections,
have had the dog on hand).
Defendant and Respondent.
7. The state does not argue that Trooper Avery had
probable cause to search either the car or the suitcases. We, therefore, need not deal with the troubl- No. 890276-CA
esome issue of whether probable cause to search an FILED: December 27, 1989
automobile is sufficient under the automobile exception to search a locked suitcase found in the trunk
of a car. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. Fourth District, Utah County
798 (1982) (if probable cause exists, police can Honorable Boyd L. Park
search closed containers found in vehicle); Arkansas ATTORNEYS:
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (warrantless search
of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi invalid); Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)
(warrantless search of a footlocker found in the R. Paul Van Dam, Allan L. Larson, Dennis
trunk of a vehicle invalid); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d
C. Ferguson, and Christopher C. Fuller,
264, 272 n.l (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J.f concurSalt Lake City, for Respondent
ring separately) (criticizing the Ross holding).
Before
Judges Bench, Jackson, and Bullock.1
8. See State v. Cole, 31 Wash. App. 501, 643 P.2d
675 (1982), where the defendant gave permission to
search his hatchback vehicle, but did not give
OPINION
consent to search the suitcases found in the vehicle.
Id. at 678. The court held that the consent to search BENCH, Judge:
the vehicle did not encompass the suitcases. Id.
Plaintiff George "Nick" Kirk appeals an
9. Trooper Avery believed that Mr. Marshall's
order
granting the State's motion to dismiss
denial of ownership of the suitcases validated the
search. He did what our case law has instructed and his negligence action. We affirm.
Plaintiffs complaint against the State stems
the defect in the search was not as a result of his
actions, but rather those of the prosecutor in failing from an injury he received while working as
to properly raise the issue of standing.
an unarmed bailiff at the Metropolitan Hall of
10. See United States v. Williams, 538 F.2d 549, 550- Justice. On April 2, 1985, Ronnie Lee
51 (4th Cir. 1976) (court found abandonment and Gardner, an inmate at the Utah State Prison,
held cases properly seized when defendant denied was escorted by two corrections officers to the
ownership of certain cases found in his motel room Hall of Justice to attend court proceedings. In
and allowed the search of the cases); United States
v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973) (court the basement of the building, a female accofound abandonment when defendants disclaimed mplice passed a loaded handgun to Gardner,
ownership of suitcases and began to walk away who then exchanged gunfire with the officers.
When plaintiff came down a stairwell to invfrom them).
11. We do not reach the issue of the voluntariness estigate the commotion, Gardner shot and
of Mr. Marshall's consent to the search of the car, seriously wounded him. See State v. Gardner,
the trunk, or the suitcases because we find there was 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1989).
no consent-in-fact to the search of the suitcases. See,
The State moved to dismiss plaintiffs
e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 complaint under the provisions of the Utah
(1973) (analysis of voluntariness of consent); State
v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah a . App. Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann.
1988) (state did not sustain its burden to prove §§63-30-1 to-38 (1989). The State contended that it was immune from suit because
defendant's consent was voluntary).
plaintiffs injury resulted from the exercise of
a governmental function. See Utah Code Ann.
§63-30-3 (1989). The State further argued
that even if the injury resulted from the negligent acts or omissions of state employees,
there is no waiver of immunity if the injury
"arises out of the incarceration of any person
in any state prison ... or other place of legal
confinement." See Utah Code Ann. §63-3010(1)0) (1989) (emphasis added).
The district court granted the State's
motion to dismiss, finding that the State's
UTAH
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ADDENDUM C

The following amendments to the United States
determinative of this matter:

Constitution

are

Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probably cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Amendment XIV, Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The following provisions of the Constitution

of the State of Utah are

determinative of this appeal:
Article 1, Section 1
All men have the inherent and unalienable right to enjoy and defend their
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship
according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceable,
protest
against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the
abuse of that right.
Article 1, Section 14

1

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized.
Article 1, Section 24
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
Article 1, Section 27
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security
of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government.
The following statutes of the State of Utah are determinative of this appeal:
Section 41-6-55
Section 41-6-117
Section 41-6-121.10
Section 41-6-162
Section 41-6-166
Section 41-6-167
Section 76-10-803
Section 77-7-15
Section 77-35-12
The following regulation and rules of the Utah Department
Safety

of

Public

are determinative of this appeal:
Utah Vehicle Safety Inspection Rule 735-100
Rules and Regulations and Instructions for Official Vehicle Inspection

Stations.
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